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The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search Rankings
Abstract
Web sites invest significant resources in trying to influence their visibility among online
search results. In addition to paying for sponsored links, they invest in methods known as
search engine optimization (SEO). We study the economic incentives of Web sites to invest
in SEO and its implications on visitor satisfaction and welfare. Our focus is on methods that
improve rankings of sites among search results without improving their quality. We find that
the process is equivalent to an all-pay auction with noise and headstarts. Our results show
that in equilibrium, under certain conditions, some positive level of search engine optimization
improves the search engine’s ranking and thus the satisfaction of its visitors. In particular, if
the quality of sites coincides with their valuation for visitors then search engine optimization
serves as a mechanism that improves the ranking by correcting measurement errors. While
this benefits consumers and search engines, sites participating in search engine optimization
could be worse off unless their valuation for traffic is very high. We also investigate how
search engine optimization affects investment by sites in content and find that it can lead to
underinvestment as a result of wasteful spending on search engine optimization.
1 Introduction
Using an online search engine is among the most common navigational paths consumers use
to discover information on the Web. As a result, search engine marketing is becoming a
dominant form of online advertising. By utilizing search marketing, Web sites that wish
to expose their content and merchandize to consumers can reach them when they search for
specific keywords that convey information about their search goals. Such targeted advertising
locations become valuable to advertisers who compete for appearing on the search results
pages.
In order to accommodate advertisers, most search engines have divided their search results
page into an organic results part and a sponsored results part. The left side of the screen is
typically used to display organic results as a ranked list of site links ordered according to their
relevance for the search query. The right side is often used to display sponsored links which
are typically auctioned to advertisers using various mechanisms. Advertisers submit bids for
having their ads placed among the sponsored links, and generally the highest bidders win the
most visible links1, usually on the top of the list. In this “official” way of search advertising,
sites get access to the right side2 of the search results page and it is clearly indicated to
visitors that theses links are paid for.
Many advertisers, however, try to find their way to the top of the organic results’ list
instead of (or in addition to) competing for sponsored links. The collection of different
actions that a site can take to improve its position on the organic list is called search engine
optimization (SEO). Improving one’s position can either be accomplished by making the site
more relevant for consumers, or by investing in different techniques that affect the search
engine’s quality ranking process. These two types of SEO techniques are often referred to as
white hat SEO and black hat SEO respectively. The important difference is that the latter
type only improves the ranking of a site among search results without affecting its quality,
whereas the former type changes the site’s ranking by improving its content and by increasing
visitor satisfaction. These activities include techniques of creating external links to the site
1The more sophisticated auction mechanisms also take into account the likelihood of a click on a given
link, estimating it from historical click-through data.
2In some cases the search engine displays sponsored links on top of the organic results as well.
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or changing the html source of the site’s pages to influence the outcome of the automatic
process that the search engine uses to evaluate each site’s relevance. In Section 5 we discuss
white hat SEO activities that consist of improving one’s content and conclude that these are
hard to separate from pure content investments. In the rest of the paper we focus on black
hat SEO methods that do not improve content and only affect the ranking of a site. We use
the term SEO to refer to such methods.
Search engines typically take a stance against black hat SEO and consider it cheating, but
to a varying extent. In some cases, they entirely remove some sites from the organic list that
are caught conducting such activities3. To set the rules, search engines sometimes publish
guidelines describing undesired practices. Google, for example, prohibits buying incoming
links to increase one’s PageRank4. Yahoo, on the other hand, simply does not give weight
to a paid link if they think it is not valuable to consumers5. In addition to simply stating
what they consider allowable, search engines can also invest significant amounts in reducing
the effectiveness of certain SEO activities6. To justify their position, search engines typically
claim that manipulation of search engine results hurts consumer satisfaction and decreases
the welfare of “honest” sites. One puzzling message that search engines convey is that the
auction mechanism for sponsored links ensures that the best advertisers will obtain the links
of highest quality, resulting in higher social and consumer welfare. Is not the case of SEO
similar? If the most resourceful sites are the ones providing the best links, why not let them
invest in improving their rankings? One reason why search engines may be unhappy with
SEO is that if sites spend significant amounts on these activities they will spend less on paid
links and content creation. To deal with this problem, some search engines allow payments
for organic links and receive the money that sites would otherwise pay to third party search
result optimizers. Baidu, the leading Chinese search engine and the world’s third largest,
3BBC News reported that Google has blacklisted BMW.de for breaching its guidelines. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4685750.stm
4Google Webmaster Central: http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=66356
5Interview with Priyank Garg, director of product management for Yahoo! Search Technology:
http://www.stonetemple.com/articles/interview-priyank-garg.shtml
6In response to Google’s regular updates of its search algorithm, different sites shuﬄe up and down wildly
in its search rankings. This phenomenon, which happens two or three times a year is called the “Google
Dance” by search professionals who give names to these events as they do for hurricanes (see “Dancing with
Google’s spiders”, The Economist, March 9, 2006).
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does accept payments for organic links7. In some industries where rankings are largely based
on consumer reviews it is very hard to determine which reviews are legitimate and which are
not, so it is very costly to fight against SEO. For example Yelp, the leading local reviews
search engine, manipulates results when a business subscribes to a Business Owner Account8.
The above examples show that it is not clear what role black hat search engine optimiza-
tion plays in the online advertising ecosystem and whether it is necessarily detrimental. Our
goal is to explore the economics of the SEO process and its effects on consumers, advertisers
and search engines. By doing so, we are able to uncover whether such manipulation of ranking
results is really harmful to consumers, and if so when. We are also able to provide recommen-
dations to search engines and advertisers on how to optimally invest in or against SEO. We
assume that the search engine’s goal is to maximize consumer satisfaction by displaying the
most relevant links to visitors, who derive utility from finding relevant, high quality sites. We
show that the search rankings process is a multi-item contest among web sites. In particular,
our model is equivalent to an all-pay auction with headstarts in which the link slots on a
search page are allocated to websites. The ranking mechanism computes a score for each site
that depends on the site’s measurement of quality. The search engine then displays a list of
search results sorted according to site scores.
Our model diverges from traditional rent seeking analysis in two components. First, the
quality of a site depends on consumers tastes for relevance. While one consumer might find a
site very relevant to a search query, another might find it less relevant than other sites. The
heterogeneity and unavoidable changes in consumer tastes make it literally impossible for a
search engine to measure a site’s relevance with absolute accuracy. The result is noise in the
scoring process used to rank websites. The existence of this noise results in suboptimal slot
allocations when SEO is not allowed. The second divergence of our model from traditional
models results from differences in intrinsic qualities among sites, as well as from the different
valuation each site places on visits by consumers. These asymmetries yield different scoring
headstarts for each site during the ranking process. A site that is on average more relevant for
7Baidu scandal makes it to CCTV: http://shanghaiist.com/2008/11/23/baidu scandal makes it to cctv.php
8East Bay Express. http://www.eastbayexpress.com/eastbay/yelp-and-the-business-of-extortion-
20/Content?oid=1176635
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consumers than other sites will have an initial advantage over other sites during the ranking
process, making the use of SEO techniques cheaper for that site.
We find that under certain conditions even black hat SEO can be advantageous to the
search engine and can increase consumer welfare in equilibrium. In particular, if sites’ valu-
ation for traffic is aligned with their relevance (quality) then the search engine is better off
when allowing some positive level of SEO than when discouraging or not allowing SEO. If,
on the other hand, there are sites with high valuation for visits, but low relevance (quality),
then SEO is generally detrimental to the search engine and consumer welfare. In other words,
if the sites that are valuable to consumers value visitors highly then a positive level of SEO
is beneficial, but if some sites that do not provide value to visitors can extract high profits
from them then SEO is detrimental. An example of such a “bad” site, which are often called
spam sites, is a site that advertises products for a very low price to lure visitors, but later on
uses the visitors’ credit card details for fraudulent activities9.
According to our results SEO can be beneficial under some conditions by improving the
rankings and getting the highest quality site on the top. However, there are potential pitfalls
of allowing too high levels of SEO. We discuss some of these in Section 5. For example,
it is not clear how SEO affects investment in content quality. We extend our model to
incorporate a content investment stage and find that high effectiveness of SEO might result
in underinvestment in content when creating content is relatively expensive.
Despite the apparent importance of the topic, there has been very little research done
on search engine optimization. At the same time, search engine optimization has grown to
become a multi-billion dollar business10. Many papers have focused on the sponsored side
of the search page and some on the interaction between the two lists. In all of these cases,
however, the ranking of a website in the organic list is given as exogenous, and the possibility
of investing in SEO is ignored, although marketers often face the problem whether and how
much to invest in SEO. Our results provide useful recommendations useful to firms that are
involved in search engine marketing and to search engines. Furthermore, given that search
engines are viewed by many today as a major gateway for information discovery, there is an
9Researchers estimate (Benczur et al. 2008) that 10-20% of Web sites constitute spam.
10See the survey conducted by seomoz.com at http://www.seomoz.org/dp/seo-industry-survey-results.
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emerging debate on the fairness of search results and ranking algorithms, and the possibility
of regulating search engines. We hope to contribute to this topic by exploring the effects of
search engine optimization on the different players in the field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of a small
selection of this diverse literature and other research areas that are relevant to our work. In
Section 3 we describe the main model and present the equilibrium outcomes of a simplified
case in Section 4 with only one organic link. Next, we examine how the SEO game affects
content investment in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 generalizes our model in several ways to
show that our main results are robust, and introduces the notion of an ordered results list
for comparison among search ranking mechanisms. All proofs and technical details appear
in the Appendix.
2 Relevant Literature
The advent of online advertising technologies and the rapid growth of the industry led to an
increase in the volume of research dedicated to this phenomenon. Works such as those by
Rutz and Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and Yang (2009) focus on consumer response to search
advertising and the different characteristics that impact advertising efficiency. Another major
stream of research, including works by Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) focus mostly
on the auction mechanism used by the different search engines to allocate their advertising
slots. More recent examples, such as those by Chen and He (2006), Athey and Ellison (2009)
and Aggarwal et al. (2008) analyze models that include both consumers and advertisers as
active players. A full overview of the literature on sponsored search is out of the scope of this
paper. Of special note, however, are papers that analyze different mechanisms to optimize
allocation of sponsored links, either to maximize advertiser profits, search engine profits, or
consumer welfare. Examples include Feng et al. (2007a), Feng et al. (2007b), Animesh et al.
(2007), Chen et al. (2009) and many more.
A number of recent papers study the interplay between the organic list and the sponsored
list. Katona and Sarvary (2010) show that the top organic sites may not have an incentive
to bid for sponsored links. Xu et al. (2009) and White (2009) study how the search engine’s
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advertising revenue from the sponsored links is affected by the organic listings.
Little attention was given to search engine optimization, although the use of SEO tech-
niques is common practice. Works such as those by Pasquale (2006) Bracha and Pasquale
(2007) and Mercadante (2008) consider the implications of search results manipulation using
the traditional view that “cheating” has strictly negative results. Different options for reg-
ulation and the need (and legality) for it are examined. The economic implications of using
bribes in contests is analyzed by Clark and Riis (2000). An important result is that allocative
efficiency is not necessarily degraded by a bribery procedure, but might increase depending
on the contest’s parameters.
The work of Xing and Lin (2006) resembles ours the most by defining “algorithm quality”
and “algorithm robustness” to describe the search engine’s ability to identify relevant websites
and eliminate non-relevant ones. Their paper shows that when advertisers’ valuation for
organic links is high enough, providers of SEO services are profitable, while search engines’
profits suffer. Considering our result that using SEO can improve consumer welfare under
noisy conditions, these results complement ours in explaining why search engines invest efforts
in fighting SEO. An earlier work by Sen (2005) develops a theoretical model that examines
the optimal strategy of mixing between investing in SEO and buying ad placements. The
model surprisingly shows that SEO should not exist as part of an equilibrium strategy.
A primary feature of our model is its equivalence to all-pay auctions when describing the
game websites compete in for locations on search result pages. The process is a rent seeking
process that is similar to lobbying and other processes described and analyzed in Hillman
and Riley (1987) and other works. An extension of the all-pay model to multiple players and
multiple items is analyzed in Barut and Kovenock (1998), Baye et al. (1996) and Clark and
Riis (1998). For a survey of the literature on contests11 under different information conditions
and contest success functions, see Konrad (2007) and Sisak (2009).
Our use of all-pay auctions takes into account initial asymmetries among sites resulting
from measurement error and different website qualities. The different qualities, measured as
a relevance measure for consumers, translate into a headstart in the initial score calculated
11Contests are all-pay competitions among bidders where the bids do not reach the auctioneer
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by the search engine to determine the auction winners. The existence of such a headstart,
which in many cases is analogous to differences in abilities of the players, results in different
equilibria as described in Kirkegaard (2009) and analyzed under more general conditions
in Siegel (2009). Our application is unique in that it considers the cases where the initial
headstart is biased by noise inherent in the quality measurement process. Krishna (2007)
is one of the few examples taking noise into consideration in an auction setting. This noise
is the main reason for the initially inefficient allocation of organic link slots, which can be
corrected by allowing for SEO. We believe that by exploring a topic that has essentially not
been studied before and by enhancing the above mentioned all-pay auction models, our paper
fills a gap on the boundary of the marketing and information systems literatures.
3 Model
A search engine (SE) is a website that provides the following service to its visitors: they
enter queries (search phrases) into a search form and the SE returns a number of results for
this query displaying them in an ordered list. This list contains a number of links to other
websites in the order of the relevance of their content for the given search phrase. In our
model, we focus on a single keyword and we assume that the relevance, or quality of a search
result is essentially the probability that a consumer is satisfied with the site once clicking on
the link12. We further assume that, for the purpose of ordering the search results, the SE’s
objective is to maximize the expected consumer satisfaction13 hence its goal is to present the
most relevant results to its visitors, and its utility is equal to the expected satisfaction level
of consumers.
In order to rank websites, the search engine uses information gathered from crawling
algorithms and data mining methods on the Internet. Let qi denote the relevance of site i in
the context of a given keyword. It is reasonable to assume that the search engine can only
measure quality with an error, and cannot observe it directly. The initial quality score that
12Modeling consumer satisfaction as a 0-1 variable is relatively simple, but captures the essence. In Section
5 we will discuss alternative formulations where qi is the average utility that a consumer gains after clicking
on link i.
13Since providing these results is typically the search engines core service to consumers its reputation and
long term profits strongly depend on the quality of this service.
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the SE assigns to a site i is thus sSi = qi + σεi, where εi are assumed to be independent and
are drawn from the same distribution. If the Web sites do not take any action the results
will be ordered according to the sSi ’s as assigned by the search engine. If, however, Web
sites can invest in SEO14, they have the option to influence their position after observing
the initial scores. The effectiveness of SEO is measured by the parameter α in the following
way. If site i invests bi in SEO, its final score becomes s
F
i = s
S
i + αbi. That is, depending
on the effectiveness of SEO, sites can influence their score to a varying extent which in turn
determines their final location in the organic list of search results. We assume that there
are n websites providing informational content or products to consumers and that those sites
derive some utility from the visiting consumers. We index the sites in decreasing order of
their quality: q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . . qn. The sites’ profits primarily depend on their traffic. We assume
that site i derives utility vi(t) of having t customers click its link in a given time period.
The behavior of the unit mass of consumers in our model is relatively simple. If a consumer
is presented with one link to site i, s/he clicks on it, and is satisfied with probability qi,
receiving a utility normalized to 1 if satisfied. If there are k > 1 links, the consumers traverse
the list of links sequentially in the order presented to them by the SE. When a consumer
is satisfied with a site s/he visits following a link, the searching ends. When a consumer is
dissatisfied with the jth site visited, s/he continues to the next link with probability cj < 1.
This latter parameter captures the fact that consumers do not search forever, but they quit
if they do not find what they are looking for after a while. An alternative formulation that
would lead to a similar process is if we assume that consumers incur a small cost every time
they click on an additional link. We provide full details of the search sequence by consumers
in Section 6.2 dealing with multiple search results.
The sequence of the game is as following. First the search engine measures the relevance
of each website and publishes sSi = qi + σεi. Next, the websites, after observing s
S
i , simulta-
neously decide how much they want to invest in SEO, changing the scores to sFi = s
S
i +α · bi.
The search engine then recalculates the scores and displays an ordered list of search results
sorted in a decreasing order of the final site scores sFi . Finally, visitors click on the results
14We do not explicitly model who conducts the SEO activities. It could be the site itself, a third party, or
in the extreme case, the search engine itself.
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according to their order until being satisfied, and payoffs are realized at the end. Our assump-
tion on the timing of the above events is somewhat simplistic, but it is the most plausible way
of capturing Web sites’ reactions to their ranking results and their subsequent investment in
SEO.
We start our analysis by examining a simple case that illustrates the main forces governing
SEO. In this case, we assume that there is one organic link displayed on the SE (k = 1) and
that there are two bidders (n = 2) with q1 > q2. We generalize to the case of n > 2 sites,
and multiple k > 1 links in Section 6.
4 SEO Equilibrium - One link
We assume that there is one organic link, and that the utility sites derive from incoming
traffic is linear in traffic, such that vi(t) = vit. Since there is a unit mass of consumers that
click on the link displayed in the search result, the valuation that sites have for the appearing
on the list is v1 and v2, respectively. We set the distribution of εi to take the value of either
1 or −1 with equal probabilities. We assume σ > |q1 − q2|/2 to ensure that the error can
affect the ordering of sites 15.
First, as a benchmark, let us examine the case in which search engine optimization is not
possible, i.e., when α = 0. In this case sites cannot influence their position among the search
results. Since q1 ≥ q2, the SE’s expected utility is 34q1 + 14q2. The effect of the error in the
SE’s measurement process is clear. With a certain probability (1/4 in this case), the order
will be suboptimal leading to a drop in expected utility compared to the first best case of q1.
When search engine optimization is effective, i.e., when α > 0, websites have a tool to
influence the order of results. The ability to influence, however, is typically asymmetric, since
sites have different starting scores sSi . A site that is in the first position in the SE’s initial
ranking has a headstart and hence can remain the first even if it invests less in SEO than
its competitor. Another characteristic of the game sites play is that their SEO investment is
sunk no matter what the outcome of the game is. Our first result states that sites essentially
participate in an all-pay auction with headstarts
15Otherwise the error never changes the order of results and the setup is equivalent to one with no error
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Lemma 1 The game that sites play after observing their starting scores is equivalent to an
all-pay auction with headstarts.
These games are generalizations of basic all-pay auctions without headstarts. In these
auctions players submit bids for an object that they have different valuations for. The player
with the highest bid wins the object, but all players have to pay their bid to the auctioneer
(hence the term “all-pay auction”). If players have headstarts then the winner is the player
with the highest score - the sum of bid and headstart (see the Appendix and Kirkegaard
(2009) for details).
The level of headstart in our model depends on the starting scores and hence on the
error. For example, if q1 > q2 and ε1 = ε2 = 1, the error does not affect the order (which is
q1 ≥ q2) nor the difference between the starting scores (q1 − q2). Since SEO effectiveness is
α, an investment of b only changes the scores by αb, therefore the headstart of site 1 is q1−q2α .
As the size of the headstart decreases with α, the more effective SEO is, the less the initial
difference in scores matters. Even if site 1 is more relevant than site 2, it is not always the
case that it has a headstart. If ε1 = −1 and ε2 = 1 then sS1 = q1 − σ < sS2 = q2 + σ given
our assumption on the lower bound on σ. Thus, player 2 has a headstart of q2+2σ−q1α . By
analyzing the outcome of the all-pay auction given the starting scores, we can determine the
expected utility of the SE and the websites.
All-pay auctions with complete information typically do not have pure-strategy Nash-
equilibria, but the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is very intuitive. In a simple auction
with two players with valuations v1 > v2, both players mix between bidding 0 and v2 with
different distributions16. Player 1, having the higher valuation, wins with the higher proba-
bility of v1/2v2 and player 2’s surplus is 0. Thus, only the player with the highest valuation
makes a positive profit in expectation, but the chance of winning gives an incentive to the
other player to submit positive bids. In the case of an all-pay auction with headstarts the
equilibrium is very similar and the player with the highest potential score (valuation plus
headstart) wins with higher probability and the other player’s expected surplus is 0. The
winner’s expected surplus is equal to the sum of differences in valuations and headstarts.
16See the Appendix for detailed bidding distributions.
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4.1 The effect of SEO on efficiency and consumer welfare
To examine the outcomes of the SEO game, we use E(α) = E(α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) to denote
the efficiency of the auction. In this case it is simply the probability that the player with
the more relevant link wins the auction (that is, player 1). Note that the efficiency coincides
with the search engine’s objective function as it wants the more relevant link to come up
first. The payoff of the search engine is a linear function of the efficiency:
piSE = q2 + (q1 − q2)E(α)
If there is no SEO, that is when α = 0 (and σ > |q1 − q2|/2), we have E(0) = 3/4. Our
goal is therefore to determine whether the efficiency exceeds this value for positive α SEO
effectiveness levels. It is useful, however, to begin with analyzing how the efficiency depends
on valuations and qualities for given α and σ values. The following Lemma summarizes our
initial results.
Lemma 2 For any fixed α and σ, E(α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) is increasing in v1 and q1 and is
decreasing in v2 and q2.
Thus, the efficiency of the ranking increases when the most relevant site becomes even
more relevant and also when its valuation for clicks increases. When there is no SEO, i.e.,
when α = 0, the Lemma holds because the efficiency simply does not change with v1, v2, q1, q2,
but when α > 0 the efficiency strictly increases and decreases in the respective variables. In
essence, the Lemma tells us that no matter how effective SEO is, the less sites valuations are
aligned with their relevance levels, the less efficient the rankings are.
The following proposition summarizes the main result of our paper, showing how SEO
affects the efficiency of the ranking.
Proposition 1
1. For any σ > |q1− q2|/2, there exists a positive αˆ = αˆ(σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) SEO effectiveness
level such that E(αˆ) ≥ E(0).
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2. If v1/v2 > 3/2 then for any σ > |q1−q2|/2, there exists a positive αˆ = αˆ(σ, v1, v2, q1, q2)
such that E(αˆ) > E(0).
3. If v1 < v2 and σ ≥ v2+v1v2−v1
q1−q2
2 then for any α > 0 we have E(α) ≤ E(0).
The first part of the proposition tells us that for any level of error there is a positive level
of SEO that does not reduce the efficiency of the ranking. Practically, if the level of SEO
effectiveness is very low (that is, its cost is high) then firms will not invest and the ranking
will not be altered.
The second point yields more interesting results. Essentially, it demonstrates that positive
levels of search engine optimization do improve the efficiency of the ranking in some cases.
When high quality sites value visitors relatively high compared to lower quality sites, SEO is
beneficial to both the search engine and consumers regardless of the level of error. The third
part states the opposite: when the player with the lower quality has a higher valuation then
all positive levels of SEO are detrimental to the efficiency (unless the error is very small).
Although our model assumes given deterministic valuations and qualities, one could imagine
a setting where these parameters are randomly drawn from a given distribution. In that case,
our results yield that the higher the correlation between a site’s quality and valuation, the
more likely that SEO improves efficiency 17.
The intuition for the results is as follows. The SEO mechanism favors bidders with high
valuations. Since the SE cannot perfectly measure site qualities, this mechanism corrects
some of the error when valuations increase monotonically in quality. When lower quality
sites have high valuation for traffic, however, SEO creates incentives that are not compatible
with the utilities of consumers or the search engine. In this latter case, the high valuation
sites which are not relevant can get ahead by investing in SEO unless the error is relatively
small18. Examples are cases of “spammer” sites that mislead consumers. In these cases
consumers do not gain any utility from visiting such sites, but the sites may profit from
17If the joint distribution of vi and qi is lognormal then one can show that the condition for part 2 is more
likely to hold when the correlation between vi and qi is higher.
18When σ is close to q1−q2
2
the efficiency can slightly exceed 3/4 for some small alpha > 0 values. This
happens because ineffective SEO gives player 1 the chance to win in cases when the error favors player 2 while
not affecting the other cases.
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consumer visits.
To better illustrate our results we consider two examples. Using SEO is very common
in the online news industry where newspapers, magazines and blogs compete for visitors.
As many content sites derive their income from displaying advertisements to their visitors,
they compete for catching a larger share of visitors for their content. In many cases, the
content of news items is not highly differentiated among those sites, and other techniques
are used to lure visitors. One technique commonly used by blogs is a mutual exchange of
site links through “trackbacks”. Whenever a blog post quotes an item from another blog by
linking to it, the quoted blog reciprocates by adding an outgoing link to the quoting blog,
called a “trackback”. The technique exploits the fact that search engine ranking processes
use incoming links as a measure of site popularity and quality. The use of trackbacks is so
prevalent that all major blogging software automatically handle their creation. Despite the
wide use of these SEO techniques news search is one of the emerging areas in the search
market. This is potentially a result of the fact that sites that offer “fake” or unoriginal
news that is not valuable to consumers are not able to attract advertisers resulting in low
profitability and hence a low valuation for links. Only sites that provide useful content are
profitable enough to be able to afford the SEO investments needed to get to one of the top
positions.
Another industry where SEO is commonly used is the e-commerce industry. Many online
shops compete for selling the same standard products, with minimal differentiation in costs,
prices and quality of service. In order to gain more visits by consumers, shops create multiple
product pages for the same product called landing pages. Each landing page contains different
wordings for describing the same product, hoping to match more visitor search queries. As
opposed to the news industry, e-commerce produces many spamming sites. In some product
categories, sites may be able to mislead consumers and even if a small proportion of them
buys a low quality product, profits and thus valuation for traffic can be quite high. This
phenomenon naturally depends on the product category, but in the ones where repeat pur-
chases are rare and where consumers are inexperienced in judging product quality, SEO can
be detrimental to consumers and high quality outlets.
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As these two examples illustrate, the effects of SEO highly depend on the ecosystem in
the industry. Our result describe the outcomes in different cases and show that in many cases
the SE is better off allowing some positive level of SEO. It is not clear, however, what the
optimal level of SEO is in these cases. In particular, how does it depend on the variance of
the measurement error? To answer this, let Aˆ(σ) denote the set of α SEO effectiveness levels
that maximize the search engine’s utility function. For two sets A1 ⊆ R and A2 ⊆ R, we say
that A1  A2 if and only if for any α1 ∈ A1 there is an α2 ∈ A2 such that α2 ≤ α1 and for
any α′2 ∈ A2 there is an α′1 ∈ A1 such that α′1 ≥ α′2.
Corollary 1 If v1/v2 > 3/2, then the optimal SEO effectiveness is increasing as the variance
of the measurement error increases. In particular, for any σ1 > σ2 > 0, we have Aˆ(σ1) 
Aˆ(σ2).
We have already shown that SEO can be beneficial because it can serve as a mechanism
that corrects the search engine’s error when measuring how relevant sites are. The above
corollary tells us that if the error is higher more effective SEO is required to correct the
error. This suggests, somewhat counter intuitively, that investments against SEO on the
SE’s part complement investment in better search algorithms, and do not substitute them.
That is, only search engines that are already very good at estimating true qualities should
fight hard against black hat SEO. Nevertheless, measurement error is not always under the
control of the search engine, but can depend on external factors and vary from keyword to
keyword. Therefore, it may make sense to allow higher levels of SEO in areas where the
quality measurement is very noisy. Another factor to consider is that although higher levels
of SEO may improve the ranking, the investments sites make in it mostly end up at firms
offering SEO services and not the SE. One solution to this problem is to allow sites to pay
for placing links among organic results, similar to what sites such as Baidu.com or Yelp.com
do. There are arguably many potential pitfalls to including paid links as part of the organic
results and we do not suggest that this is always optimal, but our model does offer a plausible
explanation as to why some search engines may do so.
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4.2 The effect of SEO on advertiser profits
When there is a positive level of SEO effectiveness, sites have a natural incentive to invest in
SEO, which they do not have when α = 0. In the extreme case of α → ∞ the difference in
initial scores dissipates and the game becomes a regular all-pay auction. If, for example, v1 >
v2 then player 1’s expected payoff is v1 − v2, whereas player 2 makes nothing in expectation.
Comparing this to the case in which there is no SEO - player 2 making v2/4 and player 1
making 3v1/4 - reveals that player 2 is worse off with SEO whereas player 1 is better off iff
v1 > 4v2. This implies that high levels of SEO only increase profits for sites with outstanding
valuations. The following corollary provides detailed results on the sites’ payoffs.
Corollary 2
1. If v1 > v2 then Player 2’s payoff is decreasing in α.
2. If v1 > v2 there always exists an α
∗ > 0 such that Player 1 is better off with an SEO
effectiveness level of α = α∗ than with α = 0. If v1 > 4v2 or σ < v1v2
q1−q2
2 then Player
1 is strictly better off.
The player with the lower valuation is therefore worse off with higher SEO. Player 1, on
the other hand, is better off with a certain positive level of SEO, especially if its valuation
is much higher than its competitor’s and if the measurement error is small. The intuition
from the former follows from the fact that higher levels of SEO emphasize the differences in
valuations, and the higher the difference the more likely that the higher valuation wins. For
the latter condition, smaller measurement errors make it easier for the player with the higher
starting score to win and to take advantage of SEO. The corollary shows that the player with
the higher valuation is generally happy with some positive level of SEO, but further analysis
(see the proof) suggests that it is not clear whether Player 1 or the search engine prefer a
higher level of SEO.
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5 Investing in Quality of Content and SEO
So far we have focused on the investment that sites can make to improve their ranking
without affecting their relevance. We did not, however, consider potential investments in
content quality. In reality, sites have several different tools to change their content and to
affect their rankings. Some of these tools, such as the aforementioned black hat methods,
clearly do not change content quality while other tools purely improve content and change
rankings indirectly through real quality improvement. In general, it is difficult to draw a clear
line between the two types since many activities, such as white hat methods, fall between
the two. In this section, we separate content investment from SEO and investigate how it
changes our main results. We acknowledge that since the common use of the term SEO
incorporates many different types of activities, some of them (especially those referred to as
white hat) would fall under the content investment category in our model. In our definition,
an investment that purely changes content quality and only affects ranking through content
quality is a content investment.
To incorporate content investments into the model, we extend the game and add a content
investment stage before the SEO stage. In this first round, sites can decide how much they
want to spend on improving their quality of content and given these quality levels they decide
how much to invest in SEO as in Section 4. All other assumptions are the same: two sites
are competing for one organic link. Let c denote the marginal cost of increasing quality19.
There are two ways how an investment in content quality could affect sites in the SEO
stage. First, an increase in qi increases the chance of the link being displayed on the top
of the organic list by the search engine, with or without SEO. Second, it can change the
valuation sites place on visits by consumers. In our basic setup vi denotes the valuation for
the link, which is the revenue accumulated across all of the unit mass of consumers visiting the
site, whether satisfied or dissatisfied with the content presented to them. It is reasonable to
assume, however, that the revenues are derived from the satisfied users, and that an increase
in satisfaction levels of users also increases the total value derived by the site per unit mass
19We assume that content costs are linearly increasing, however, a convex cost function would yield similar
results
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of consumers. Therefore, investment in quality can also increase the valuation of the site
getting the top link. We first ignore this effect and focus on the case in which valuation is
not affected by the quality investment.
5.1 Fixed Valuations
Here, we solve a game in which sites’ valuations for getting to the top position are fixed and
not affected by the quality investment. As a benchmark, let us consider the case in which
there is no SEO, i.e., α = 0. For simplicity we also assume that σ = 0, that is, there is
no measurement error in this benchmark case. Since there is no SEO, the game becomes a
one-shot game, essentially an all-pay auction, where the winner gets all the benefits. As we
mentioned before, these games do not have pure-strategy equilibria, but the mixed strategy
equilibria are very intuitive. The site with the higher valuation (e.g. player 1) wins the
auction with a higher probability (1− v2/2v1) and has an expected payoff of v1− v2, whereas
the other player has an expected payoff 0. To make the analysis simple, we examine the case
when v1 = v2 = v. In this case the players win with equal probability, make 0 payoff and
each invest v/2c in expectation.
Now let us examine the case in which sites first have the option of investing in content,
then in SEO. The exhaustive description of the mixed strategies would be too complex,
therefore we focus on the symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium with pure strategies in
the first stage. This allows us to point out the differences that the content investment stage
makes without determining all the mixed strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2 The only possible equilibrium with pure strategies in the first stage is the one
in which sites do not invest in content but will invest in SEO and earn an expected payoff
of min(σ/2α, v/4). The above mentioned is an equilibrium if and only if (c > vα−5σ2vα−4σ
1
α and
σ < vα/4) or (c > 34
1
α and vα/4 ≤ σ < vα/2) or (c > 12 1α and vα/2 ≤ σ)
Generally, if the cost of investing in content is high relative to the effectiveness of SEO
then sites will give up their investments in quality and instead will focus on search engine
optimization. Note that this critical cost level is decreasing in SEO effectiveness, therefore
the more effective search engine optimization is the more likely that sites will not improve
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their content. In all the cases, when c > 1/α we get the no investment equilibrium. Since
the inverse of SEO effectiveness is essentially its cost we obtain the result that if content is
more expensive than SEO then sites will not invest in it20. In particular, to compare with
the benchmark case when σ = 0, we get that sites do not invest in content iff c > 12
1
α , that
is, the critical cost above which sites substitute SEO for content is half of the SEO cost. If
content costs are low then sites will naturally improve their content, but there are generally
no equilibria with pure strategies in the first stage, which is natural given the all-pay auction
structure.
The intuition behind the results is straightforward. If the cost of content is high compared
to SEO then sites will not attempt to get a headstart for the SEO game, they will instead
compete with their SEO investments directly. If, on the other hand, content costs are low,
they may engage in investing in content to get a headstart for the SEO game, where they do
not have to invest heavily. We do not explore in detail what happens if c is low because of
the complexity of the game. There are certainly no equilibria with pure strategies in the first
case, but the game becomes similar to an all-pay auction where, presumably, an equilibrium
in mixed strategies exist with positive expected content investment. The results thus show
that having a highly effective SEO level can result in underinvestment in quality which hurts
consumers and the search engine in the long run.
In the above setup we restricted the benefits of content investment to improving the
position in the contest for the organic link and did not consider the additional effects of making
more profit per visitor. In what follows, we investigate how the possibility of SEO affects
content investment when such investment improves profitability in addition to attracting
more visitors.
5.2 Valuations Increasing with Quality
We proceed with analyzing the case when an investment in content also increases sites’
valuation for a link. There are several possible functional forms to capture this relationship.
We employ the most parsimonious form by assuming that vi = v + qim, where v and m
20Note that this is not a binding condition. The Proposition shows that in many cases even if content is
cheaper than SEO sites will not invest in it.
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are site-independent positive parameters. Here, v can be interpreted as the sites’ baseline
valuation of customers, whereas m corresponds to the margin gained on a satisfied customers.
With this formulation, it is obvious that a monopolist would invest in content iff c < m.
However, if there are two players they may compete even if c ≥ m, incentivized by the fixed
portion of the reward. In the benchmark case of no SEO (and σ = 0), the second stage of the
game becomes completely determined and the first stage is an all-pay auction with variable
rewards. One can determine that in equilibrium players mix between 0 and vc−m with a mean
investment of vm
(− cm ln(1−m/c)− 1) > 0. That is, no matter how high c is compared to m
sites invest in content. Now let us examine the situation with positive levels of SEO in the
second stage.
Proposition 3 When vi = v + qim, the only possible equilibrium with pure strategies in the
first stage is the one in which sites do not invest in content. The above mentioned is an
equilibrium if c > 1α +m.
These results are very similar to that of the case with fixed valuations in that if content
quality is expensive enough then sites will forfeit the opportunity to invest in it. An important
difference is that since the quality investment will also change valuations, sites will take that
into account when comparing its costs to SEO. It is useful to note that the critical value for
c above which this happens is generally decreasing and often lower than 1α + m. Therefore
the more effective SEO sites expect in the second stage the more reluctant they will be to
invest in content because of anticipating the wasteful spending on SEO.
In summary, the results in this section highlight the fact that search engines should be
careful when allowing some level of SEO activity to take advantage of its forces that improve
the ranking, because at the same time it could discourage sites from investing in content,
thus hurting consumer satisfaction in the long run.
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6 Model Generalizations
6.1 Single link, multiple sites and arbitrary error distribution
In this section we show that our main results are robust under more general assumptions.
First, we relax the assumption on the distribution of the search engine’s measurement error
and allow more than two sites to compete for one organic link. We assume that there are n
websites that are considered by the search engine for inclusion in the organic list (consisting
of one link) with q1 > q2 > . . . > qn. All the other assumptions are identical to those in
Section 4. Regarding the error εi , we allow its distribution to be arbitrary with a mean of
zero and a finite variance normalized to 1. Similarly to Section 4, we assume that the error
is large enough that it makes a difference, that is, we assume that ε1 − ε2 can take a value
of less than q2 − q1 with positive probability. The following proposition shows that even in
this case SEO can improve the efficiency of the auction if the valuations of the most relevant
sites are high enough.
Proposition 4 For any σ there exist a vˆ(σ) > v2 and an αˆ(σ) > 0 such that if v1 > vˆ and
v2 > vi for every i ≥ 3 then E(αˆ) > E(0).
This result generalizes our results in Proposition 1. If the valuations of the two most
relevant sites are high enough then the rest of the sites are in double disadvantage due to
the low starting scores and their lower valuations. This will lead to only the first two sites
investing in SEO for high enough effectiveness levels. The competition of these two sites is
similar to that in Section 4: If the error does not reverse their starting scores compared to
their true relevance, then site 1 has a high chance to win keeping the right order. If, however,
the ranking is reversed due to the error then although site 2 might have a good chance to get
into the first position, for high SEO effectiveness levels the higher valuation of site 1 limits
this probability.
6.2 Multiple links
In this section we analyze the case of search results comprised of multiple links. We begin
by considering how consumers behave when presented with an ordered list of results. The
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reason is that our assumption that consumers will certainly click any link on the list does not
hold anymore. It is also not obvious what order of search consumers will choose, and what
type of utility they experience when being dissatisfied with a visited site.
Suppose the search engine assigns n websites with qualities q1 > q2 > . . . > qn to n links,
and presents an ordered list to consumers. If the qualities of sites were fully observable,
either directly or through a truth-telling mechanism, the search engine could sort the list in
descending order of site qualities. Previous research by Athey and Ellison (2009) and Chen
and He (2006) shows that consumer surplus increases when presented with a fully sorted
list compared to a randomly ordered list, while Aggarwal et al. (2008) show that under a
Markovian consumer search model, similar monotonic click probabilities arise in the optimal
assignment.
In the organic results case, however, the ranked list produced by the search engine is
different in two important manners. First, the fact that the search engine has errors in its
calculation of scores inhibits its ability to fully sort sites according to their qualities. Second,
when SEO is not effective (α = 0), the resulting list is not completely random. We therefore
require a structure that allows the comparison of welfare derived from differently sorted list.
Formally, we define a structure on ordered lists that allows a measurement of their distance
from being optimally sorted. An ordered list of n items is a collection of n random variables
Q = (f1, . . . , fn). The variable fj contains the distribution of qualities of sites appearing in
location j in the list. In a completely random list, for example, fj(qi) = 1/n for every j and
i, while in a fully sorted list, which we denote QS , fSj (qi) = 1 for j = i and zero otherwise.
When SEO is not effective in our game, the distribution of scores for each site has a
different mean, where sites with higher qualities have higher score means, and thus higher
probability of appearing higher on the ranked list. The result is that the initial ordered list
displayed by the search engine in not completely random. When SEO is effective, however,
more relevant sites have an even higher probability of appearing higher on the ranked list,
as is shown below. The result is an ordered list that is, in a sense, closer to the first best
fully sorted list, but can never match it because of the noisy process. A common claim in the
literature is that sponsored link auctions improve social and consumer welfare tremendously.
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We believe the benchmark case for such auctions should not be randomly ordered lists, but
rather lists resulting from organic search rankings. Given these lists are not random, the
change in welfare decreases. Nevertheless, we leave exploration of the magnitude of this
welfare change for further research.
For our purposes, the structural representation of ordered lists would allow for a compar-
ison of two lists according to their distance from the fully sorted list in terms of the expected
consumer surplus generated by a search on each list. The actual calculation and comparison
of the surpluses, however, is complex for general distributions of errors, values and qualities.
A more natural measure of distance of ordered lists is to sum the sum-square distances of
each fj from the fully sorted fj for all j, yielding
δ =
j=n∑
j=1
i=n∑
i=1
[fj(qi)− fSj (qi)]2.
We conjecture that lists with a smaller distance measure yield higher expected consumer sur-
plus. In what follows, we use several simplifications to show that consumer surplus increases
when SEO is effective.
We assume consumers traverse ordered lists in a sequential manner, starting with the link
at location 1. When encountering a link in position j, consumers click it and visit the page it
leads to, being satisfied with probability q¯j = E(fj).21 If the consumers are not satisfied with
the result, they move on to the next link with probability 0 < cj < 1, or stop otherwise. The
next link is then clicked, and the consumer is satisfied with probability q¯j+1 and so forth.
The consumer’s expected utility from traversing the first k links is thus
Ek(Q) =
k∑
j=1
[cj · E(fj) · Pr(z1 = . . . = zj−1 = 0)]
when zj is the probability that link j was searched and was found unsatisfying.
The ranking process, followed by the search process, is analogous to the search engine
performing a sequential all-pay auction of the links as described in Clark and Riis (1998),
where in each stage a single link is auctioned using the game described in section 3, and is
21The qualities of sites are probabilities, thus the expected value of fj is the expected satisfaction from
visiting sites in location j on a list
22
presented to the visitor. If the visitor is not satisfied with the result, the winning website of
the previous auction is removed from the list of competitors, and the auction of another link
commences again. We impose two simplifications to analyze the game. First, we assume that
the search engine picks a website to display for link j from fj independently. This would mean
that the case of a website being displayed twice in a ranked search process might happen with
some probability. This probability decreases with the SEO effectiveness parameter. Second,
we assume that in the auction process for link j, only the weights on qj and qj+1 are updated,
both for the distribution fj and the distributions of lower links on the list, fj+1 . . . fn.
Proposition 5 extends our previous results to the multiple links case, and shows that when
noise exists in the ranking mechanism, SEO can improve consumer’s welfare:
Proposition 5 Let Q(α) = (f1(α), . . . , fn(α)) be the ranked list resulting from n sequential
all-pay auctions with effectiveness level α, where in auction j the sites with quality scores qj
and qj+1 are the sole competitors, then for any σ and for any εi ∼ i.i.d(0, σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n there
exists a ∆v(σ) > 0 and a positive αˆ(σ) such that if vi > vi+1 + ∆v(σ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n then
Ek(Q(αˆ)) > Ek(Q(0)) for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Proposition 5 says that if the valuation sites place on visitors are spread enough, then
a sequential game of presenting one link at a time to the consumer while allowing for SEO
can increase the consumer’s satisfaction. The intuition behind the result is that each time a
consumer is dissatisfied with a link but chooses to continue, the search engine can just run
an auction for one link with the remaining competitors, and present it to the consumer. The
game is then reduced to multiple repetitions of our single link game.
An interesting result of our formulation is that consumer welfare increases no matter how
many links are searched before stopping. In a fully sorted list, however, assuming that a
consumer would always search through the first k links means that any order of the first k
links will yield the same consumer welfare, as these are k independent Bernoulli trials. There
is significant evidence, however, that a consumer’s probability of visiting a site (also called a
click-through-rate, or CTR) is dependent on the site’s location on the ranked list, as well as
on other results displayed on the list. Several theoretical models explain this phenomenon,
but typically show that the probability of visiting any site is monotonically decreasing in its
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distance from the top of the list. Using empirical data, Ghose and Yang (2009), Jeziorski and
Segal (2009) and others have shown that this dependence is not straightforward, and that
CTRs do not necessarily decrease in a monotonic way across a ranked list. Our assumption
that consumers flip a coin after unsuccessful searches to decide whether to continue or not
consolidates the majority of the evidence with our improved efficiency result.
7 Conclusion
We model search engine optimization as an all-pay auction where sites can invest in improving
their search ranking without changing their link’s relevance. We find that some level of SEO
can be useful to the search engine and its customers because it acts as a mechanism that
improves the rankings by placing sites with high valuations for the links higher on the results
list. In general, if sites’ valuations for consumers are aligned with how much utility consumers
gain when visiting them then SEO is beneficial to both the search engine and consumers.
Participating sites, on the other hand, might be worse off as they carry the extra burden of
having to invest in SEO, whereas if search engine optimization does not exist they do not
have to make additional effort. In the case when a low quality site has high valuation for
traffic, it can benefit from the presence of SEO and get to an undeserved, better position,
hindering search engine payoffs and consumer benefits.
In general, we find that when the search algorithms of the SE are less accurate, higher
levels of SEO are more likely to be beneficial. Nevertheless, money that web sites spend on
SEO is, to some extent, wasteful spending and could affect sites behavior in different ways. For
example, they could spend less on sponsored links, hurting SE profits, or could invest less in
content. We thoroughly investigate how the presence of SEO affects sites incentives to invest
in quality improvement and find that if the marginal cost of content is high then sites may
underinvest as a consequence of the presence of SEO. This phenomenon of underinvestment
is more likely with higher SEO effectiveness levels.
Our paper has important practical implications. Contrary to the popular belief, allowing
sites to invest in improving their ranking without improving their relevance can be beneficial
to the search engine and the consumers, but can hurt the top sites even if they end up
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high eventually. Our result explain why some search engines seem to work very hard to
reduce the possibility and effectiveness of SEO, while others like Baidu or Yelp even offer
such services themselves. Our results suggest that when the search algorithms are not very
accurate or when SEO methods are hard to identify, allowing some level of black hat SEO
does not necessarily compromise the results. Despite the potential advantages, search engines
should be careful not to allow SEO to be too effective, so that sites do not invest in SEO
instead of content or sponsored links. If sites invest too much in wasteful SEO spending
they might cut back on content quality hurting consumer and search engine benefits in the
long run as the funds sites spend on SEO are not transferred to consumers in matters of
content improvement. Our results also provide important recommendations to websites that
are competing for top organic links. Contrary to popular belief, sites engaging in SEO are
not only sites that wish to achieve a better position than their true quality merits, but also
top quality sites that need to defend their position.
We believe that the economics of search engine optimization is a topic of high importance
to both academics and practitioners. In this paper we examine the basic forces of this
interesting and unusual ecosystem. Given the complexity of the problem, our model has a
number of limitations that could be explored by future research. First of all, we model SEO
as a static game, whereas in reality sites invest in SEO dynamically, reacting to each other’s
and the search engine’s actions. We also assume that the number of consumers that visit
the search engine is fixed and does not depend on the quality of the results. This might
not be true in a competitive environment where search engines with inferior links are likely
to receive fewer visitors. However, this effect would reinforce our results in the following
way. Lower quality sites would realize that, on the long run, acquiring top links via SEO
would reduce the overall quality of the search engine, resulting in fewer visitors. This would
essentially decrease low quality sites’ valuation for top links. Finally, we do not explicitly
examine how search engines can invest in reducing SEO. Our results yield that under certain
conditions having some SEO is beneficial, but we do not determine how much it is worth
investing against SEO when it is too effective and is detrimental. Depending on the costs of
reducing SEO, it might be unprofitable for the search engine to do so.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We decompose the final scores of both sites into a headstart h and
a bid as follows: s˜F1 = h+ b1 and s˜
F
2 = b2 where h =
sS1−sS2
α . The decomposed scores have the
property that for every b1, b2 s˜
F
1 ≥ s˜F2 ⇐⇒ sF1 ≥ sF2 and thus preserve the outcome of the
SEO game. Since the investments are sunk and only the winner receives the benefits (with
the exception of a draw) the SEO game is equivalent to an all-pay auction with a headstart
of h =
sS1−sS2
α . In the following, we present the solution of such a game to facilitate the
presentation of the remaining proofs.
Solution of all-pay auctions with headstarts: As derived by Kirkegaard (2009), the
generic two player all-pay auction with headstarts has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
When players valuations are v1 ≥ v2 and player 1 has a headstart of h then s/he wins the
auction with the following probabilities:
W1(h) = Pr(1 wins|h ≥ 0) =
{
1 h > v2
1− v22v1 + h
2
2v1v2
h ≤ v2
W1(h) = Pr(1 wins|h < 0) =

1− v22v1 h ≥ v2 − v1
v21−h2
2v1v2
−v1 ≤ h < v2 − v1
0 otherwise
For completeness, we specify the players’ cumulative bidding distributions. When h is
positive,
F1(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
h+b
v2
b ∈ (0, v2 − h]
1 b > v2 − h
F2(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
1− v2−hv1 b ∈ (0, h]
1− v2−bv1 b ∈ (h, v2]
1 b > v2
(1)
When h is negative,
F1(b) =

0 b ≤ h
b−h
v2
b ∈ (h, v2 + h]
1 b > v2 + h
F2(b) =

0 b ≤ 0
1− v2−bv1 b ∈ (0, v2]
1 b > v2
(2)
In our model, the value of the headstart is determined by the different realizations of
the errors ε1, ε2. There are four possible realizations with equal probability: h1 = h2 =
q1−q2
α , h3 =
q1−q2+2σ
α and h4 =
q1−q2−2σ
α .
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Recall, that we use E(α) = E(α;σ) = E[Pr(1 wins)] to denote the efficiency of the rank-
ing, which matches the search engine’s utility function, with E(0) = 3/4 in the benchmark
case.
Proof of Lemma 2: Since E(α) = 12W1(h1)+
1
4W1(h3)+
1
4W1(h4) and the headstart does
not depend on v1 and v2, it is enough to show that W1(·) is increasing in v1 and decreasing in
v2. These easily follow from the definition of W1(·). The results on q1 and q2 follow from the
fact that h1, h3, h4 are all increasing in q1 and decreasing in q2, and W1(·) depend on them
only through h in which it is increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1: We use the notation Pi = Pr(1 wins|hi). Given the above
described equilibrium of the two-player all-pay auctions we have Pi = W1(hi). We further
define α1 =
q1−q2
v2
, α3 =
q1−q2+2σ
v2
, α4 =
q2−q1+2σ
v1
, α′4 =
q2−q1+2σ
v1−v2 . Note that P1 = P2, since
the headstarts in the first two case are equal. Thus E(α) = 12P1 +
1
4P3 +
1
4P4, and P1 = 1
iff α ≤ α1, P3 = 1 iff α ≤ α3, P4 = 1− v22v1 iff α ≥ α′4. Furthermore, it is easy to check that
α1 ≤ α3, α4 ≤ α3, and α4 ≤ α′4.
We proceed by separating the three parts of the proposition:
• Part 1: By setting α = α1, we have P1 = P3 = 1, and thus E(α) ≥ 3/4 for any σ.
• Part 2: In order to prove this part, we determine the α value that yields the highest
efficiency level for a given σ if v1/v2 > 3/2. As noted above, E(α) is a linear combination
of W1(h1), W1(h3), W1(h4). Since W1(·) is continuous and h1, h3, h4 are all continuous
in α, it follows that E(α) is continuous in α. However, E(α) is not differentiable
everywhere, but there are only a finite number of points where it is not. Therefore
it suffices to examine the sign of E′(α) to determine whether it is increasing or not.
This requires tedious analysis, since depending on the value of σ the formula describing
E(α) is different in up to five intervals. We identify five different formulas that E(α)
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can take in different intervals and take their derivatives:
E′(α) = E′1(α) =
(q1 − q2 − 2σ)2
4α3v1v2
if α4 ≤ α ≤ α1&α′4,
E′(α) = E′2(α) = −
(q1 − q2)2
2α3v1v2
if α1 ≤ α ≤ α4,
E′(α) = E′3(α) = −
2(q1 − q2)2 + (q1 − q2 + 2σ)2
4α3v1v2
if α3&α
′
4 ≤ α,
E′(α) = E′4(α) =
4σ2 − (q1 − q2)(4σ + q1 − q2)
4α3v1v2
if α1&α4 ≤ α ≤ α′4,
E′(α) = E′5(α) = −
(q1 − q2)(4σ + q1 − q2)
2α3v1v2
if α3&α
′
4 ≤ α.
In any other range the derivative of E(α) is 0. It is clear from the above formulas
that E′1(α) is always positive and that E′2(α), E′3(α), and E′5(α) are always negative.
Furthermore, one can show that
E′4(α) > 0 iff σ >
1 +
√
2
2
(q1 − q2).
This allows us to determine the maximal E(α) for different values of σ in four different
cases.
1. If q1−q22 ≤ σ ≤ v1v2
q1−q2
2 then α4 ≤ α′4 ≤ α1 ≤ α3 and the derivative of E(α) takes
the following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, E′1(α), 0, E′2(α), E′3(α).
Therefore E(α) is first constant, then increasing, then constant again and then
strictly decreasing. Thus, any value between α′4 and α1 maximizes E(α). Using
the notation of Corollary 1, Aˆ(σ) = [α′4, α1].
2. If v1v2
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ ≤ v1+v2v2
q1−q2
2 then α4 ≤ α1 ≤ α′4 ≤ α3 and the derivative of E(α)
takes the following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, E′1(α), E′4(α), E′2(α),
E′3(α). Therefore E(α) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing,
then depending on the sign of E′4(α) increasing or decreasing, and finally strictly
decreasing. Therefore if σ < 1+
√
2
2 (q1 − q2) then α1 maximizes E(α), that is
Aˆ(σ) = {α1}. If σ = 1+
√
2
2 (q1− q2) then E(α) is constant between α1 and α′4, that
is Aˆ(σ) = [α1, α
′
4]. Finally, if σ =
1+
√
2
2 (q1 − q2) then Aˆ(σ) = {α′4}.
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3. If v1+v2v2
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ ≤ v12v2−v1
q1−q2
2 then α1 ≤ α4 ≤ α′4 ≤ α3 and the derivative of
E(α) takes the following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, E′2(α), E′4(α),
E′2(α), E′3(α). In this case E′4(α) > 0 since σ ≥ v1+v2v2
q1−q2
2 ≥ (1 + 32) q1−q22 >
(1 +
√
2) q1−q22 . Therefore E(α) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly
increasing again and finally strictly decreasing. Thus, there are two candidates
for the argmax: α1 and α
′
4. One can show that E4(α
′
4) > E2(α1) iff v1 >
√
2v2,
therefore α′4 maximizes E(α) in this case.
4. If v12v2−v1
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ then α1 ≤ α4 ≤ α3 ≤ α′4 and the derivative of E(α) takes the
following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, E′2(α), E′4(α), E′5(α), E′3(α).
Similarly to the previous case E′4(α) > 0, therefore E(α) is first constant, then de-
creasing, then strictly increasing again and finally strictly decreasing. Comparing
the two candidates for the argmax yields that E4(α3) > E2(α1) iff v1 > (3/2)v2,
that is α3 maximizes E(α) in this case.
In each of the cases above, it is clear that the maximum is higher than E(0) = 3/4. In
cases 1 and 2, E(α) is strictly increasing after a constant value of 3/4 and in cases 3
and 4 we directly compared to E2(α1) = 3/4. This completes the proof of Part 2.
• Part 3: One can derive the efficiency function for different cases as in Part 2. It follows
that if σ ≥ v2+v1v2−v1
q1−q2
2 then E
′(α) is first 0 then negative and finally positive. Therefore
E(α) either has a maximum in α = 0 or as it approaches infinity. However,
E(α) −→
α→∞
v1
2v2
≤ 1
2
<
3
4
= E(0).
Proof of Corollary 1: In the proof of Proposition 1, we determined the values of α
that maximize E(α) for different σ’s. In summary:
Aˆ(σ) =

[α′4, α1] if
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ ≤ v1v2
q1−q2
2
α1 if
v1
v2
q1−q2
2 < σ ≤ (1 +
√
2) q1−q22
[α1, α
′
4] if σ = (1 +
√
2) q1−q22
α′4 if (1 +
√
2) q1−q22 < σ ≤ v1+v2v2
q1−q2
2
α′4 if
v1+v2
v2
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ ≤ v12v2−v1
q1−q2
2
α3 if
v1
2v2−v1
q1−q2
2 ≤ σ
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It is straightforward to check that all of α1, α3, and α
′
4 are increasing in σ and that the Aˆ(σ)
is increasing over the entire range.
Proof of Corollary 2: First, we describe the payoffs of the two players in an all-pay
auction with headstarts. When players follow the mixed strategies described in (1) and (2),
player 1’s payoff is:
pi1(h) =

0 h ≤ v2 − v1
v1 − v2 + h v2 − v1 < h < v2
1 h ≥ v2
where h is the headstart of player 1. The payoff of player 2 can be obtained from the same
formula by changing the roles. Then, we get player i’s total payoff by linearly combining the
above quantities:
pi1 =
1
2
pi1(h1) +
1
4
pi1(h3) +
1
4
pi1(h4)
Then following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can determine the values of
α that maximize Player 1’s payoff for different σ’s. We get the following results. If v1 ≤ 3v2
then
arg max
α
pi1 =
{
α1 if σ ≤ v1v2
q1−q2
2
[0, α1] if
v1
v2
q1−q2
2 < σ
In case of 3v2 < v1 ≤ 4v2
arg max
α
pi1 =

α1 if σ ≤ v1v2
q1−q2
2
α3 if
v1
v2
q1−q2
2 < σ ≤ v14v2−v1
q1−q2
2
[0, α1] if
v1
4v2−v1
q1−q2
2 < σ
Finally, when v1 ≤ 4v2 we have
arg max
α
pi1 =
{
α1 if σ ≤ v1v2
q1−q2
2
s3 if
v1
v2
q1−q2
2 < σ
It is easy to see that with exception of the two cases when the optimal α is anywhere between
0 and α1, Player 1 is strictly better off with a particular positive level of SEO than without
it.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that we can determine Player 1’s payoff as
pi1 =
1
2
pi1(h1) +
1
4
pi1(h3) +
1
4
pi1(h4),
30
whereas Player 2’s payoff is given by reversing the roles. Examining the above formula shows
that each players payoff only depends on q1 − q2 and not the individual qualities and is a
continuous function which is linear with different slopes in different intervals. The function
takes 3 different forms in the cases of vα/2 ≥ σ, vα/4 ≥ σ < vα/2, σ < vα/4. In all cases the
slope is less than or equal to 14
1
s for q1 − q2 < 0. In the first two cases the slope is decreasing
for q1 − q2 > 0 with a slope of 12 1s and 34 1s above zero, respectively in the two cases. In the
third case the slope above zero is first 34
1
s then
1
s . First we show that only (0, 0) can be a
pure strategy equilibrium in the first stage. Since the slope below zero is quite shallow, if
the marginal cost of content c > 14
1
s then sites have an incentive to decrease the investment.
If, on the other hand c ≤ 14 1s then sites have an incentive to invest more since the slope
above zero is always higher than this. To show when (0, 0) is an equilibrium, we fix q2 = 0
and look at whether Player 1 has an incentive invest more than 0. In the first two cases the
critical value of c will just be the slope of Player 1’s payoff function above zero: 12
1
s and
3
4
1
s ,
respectively. Player 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from zero iff c is higher than
the respective slope. In the third case determining the critical value requires more detailed
analysis since the slope increases. The analysis reveals that the best player 1 can do is achieve
a payoff of v − 2σ/s− σ/(2s) with an investment of vs− 2σ yielding the critical value for c
and completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2
we can determine the payoffs as a function of each player’s quality investment. The same
logic shows that the only possible pure strategy equilibrium is the one in which players do
not invest in content. One can then separate three cases in which the payoff functions take
different forms and show that the slope is always at most 1α +m.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, we derive the efficiency of the ranking process given
the error term. Let f∆(.) be the density function of the distribution of ε1 − ε2. If α is high
enough then the headstarts diminish and the sum of the valuation and the headstart for sites
3 and below will be lower than for 1 and 2. In an all-pay auction this leads to only the first
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two site’s participation. Then using the notation of the proof of Proposition 1 we have
Pr(1 wins) = E(α) = EW1
(
q1 − q2 + σε1 − σε2
α
)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
W1(h)f∆
((
h− q1 + q2
σ
)
α
)
dh.
Note that for positive h the value of W1(h) is strictly higher than 1−v1/2v2 and for h > v2−v1
it is exactly 1 − v2/2v1. Furthermore if α is high enough then for an arbitrary small δ we
have ∫ v2−v1
−∞
f∆
((
h− q1 + q2
σ
)
α
)
dh < δ.
Let αˆ denote such a high α and let δ be smaller than 1 − E(0) > 0. Then E(αˆ) > (1 −
v2/2v1)(1− δ). Finally, let vˆ = v2(1−δ)2(1−δ−E(0)) . Then v1 > vˆ yields E(αˆ) > E(0).
Proof of Proposition 5: Our proof uses an induction on k, the number of links searched
by the consumer. When k = 1, proposition 4 gives the necessary conditions and result. Given
the independence assumption on choice of links to display in each auction the expected utility
of the consumer from searching k links is
Ek = Ek−1 + (1− Ek−1)ckq¯k > Ek−1.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists an αˆ(σ) and a ∆v(σ) such that if vi > vi+1 +
∆v(σ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 then ∆Ek−1 = Ek−1(Q(αˆ))− Ek−1(Q(0)) > 0.
Suppose vk > vk+1 + ∆v(σ). Since Ek > Ek−1 for every k and every α, it must be that
∆Ek ≥ ∆Ek−1 > 0 which concludes the proof.
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